Three Motives Behind the Russian Chemical Weapons Proposal

It has been less than two weeks since Russian President Vladmir Putin interjected himself into Washington’s march to war, sending shockwaves through the American media. By putting a sudden halt in the steady buildup toward U.S. intervention in Syria, he reignited American recognition that Russia can still be a major player in world affairs—though the talking heads remain uncertain how much malign intent to read into the action.  To gain a better understanding of the prospects of the deal, which aims to eliminate Syrian chemical weapons stockpiles with international oversight, it is important to analyze the possible reasons for which he has made the overture.

1) “Poking a Stick in America’s Eye”

If one listens to the most adamant proponents of intervention or conservatives in general, it is hard to avoid this misperception. The move has been described a ploy to knock the U.S. down a peg and cause it to lose face in the international community: if America ignores the proposal and strikes unilaterally, it would be perceived as brash and arrogant; if America accepts the proposal and finds it to be a mere distraction, it would appear weak and gullible. That the latter point ignores the potential for the administration to turn the failure of the process into a far stronger justification for intervention goes to show how short-sighted interventionists tend to be. If they can’t think two obvious steps ahead, how can we trust their sunny optimism on an intervention’s consequences? Of course, none of this is to say that raising Russia’s international prestige relative to that of the United States is not a factor, just that it is the cherry on top of more substantive reasoning.

2) Serious Concern for Rising Radicalism

Rather than just considering the matter from the classic, us-vs.-them, Cold-War mindset, it is important to give some thought to Mr. Putin’s domestic concerns. Americans tend to be unfamiliar with Russia’s demographic situation, so tend to be entirely ignorant of the country’s troubles in the Caucuses and how that might be linked to the conflict in Syria.  The predominantly Muslim districts have chafed violently under Russian rule going back to the times of the Tsar and the region’s separatists have been responsible for truly awful terrorism throughout Russia. This is not to discount the legitimacy of their protest against Moscow’s control—indeed, Russia’s blood-soaked oppression went far beyond the pinpricks of the rebels. Nonetheless, Putin is correct in his assertion that Syria is serving the clarion call of radicalization for the world’s young, disaffected Muslims. The Free Syrian Army, the secular, U.S.-preferred opposition force may be the international face for the rebels, but have been factitious from the start and would be in no position to take over governance in a post-Assad Syria. Now, they violently vie for power with Islamist groups as much as they do against the regime. Contrary to the obstinate claims of John McCain, it is unclear that more substantial American aid at the start of the conflict would have averted this situation or left the aftermath of an intervention any more orderly.

Russia's Chechnya Policy

Mr. Putin fears a rebel victory will leave Syria the next Afghanistan, a hotbed for ultra-radical Islam that will cause flare-ups in the Caucuses, across Europe, and could even contribute to another attack on the United States. It is clear that President Obama shares these concerns, as his support for the actual fighters has been tepid at most. Grating though it may be, the United States lacks a dog in the fight and should aim to diminish civilian suffering and violations of international norms. The proposed deal would do both without backing either side.

3) Buying Time for Assad

One undeniable aspect of the proposal is that it would buy the Assad regime a considerable amount of time. Unless they insist on especially unreasonable conditions in the deal or provide blatantly insufficient support to inspectors, the safe and verifiable destruction of chemical weapons will take many months to carry out, months in which the United States will not be striking Syrian military assets. This both gives the Syrian military some room to expand on the gains they have made against opposition groups over the past months, and time for the opposition to hang itself in the court of international opinion. Should current trends continue, the FSA may become undeniably subordinate to the Islamist fighters and sour many toward the prospect of a rebel victory. In this scenario, Assad need cooperate only just enough to keep the inspectors happy.

There are obvious implications based off all of this for U.S. policy going forward, but I’ll save that post for another time. Don’t hesitate to voice comments or questions below!