The Elephant in the Room: Why the Reluctance to Vote on Intervention?

No matter the circumstances, any state wishing to initiate the use of force against another must receive authorization by the United Nations in order for the action to enjoy full legality and legitimacy under international law. Officially, at least. Blatant violations and devious subversions abound from all sides since the inauguration of the UN Charter in 1945. Yet the majority of world leaders still advocate for the supranational organization and rhetorically adhere to its mandates.

Why states maintain their rhetorical support for the United Nations is a topic for another time. More relevant to current affairs has been the Obama administration's reluctance to submit a resolution to the United Nations Security Council--the highest body at the UN, composed of the United States, England, France, China, and Russia, plus a smattering of non-permanent members--citing the "inevitability" of a veto from Russia and China. Russia has indeed asked that the resolution introduced by UK Prime Minister David Cameron be tabled until UN inspectors conclude their report in the next week, but that does seem an entirely justifiable demand.

Still, Russia and China's veto of a resolution placing punitive sanctions on the Syrian regime in 2012 earned much justifiable condemnation from around the world. A resolution allowing the use of force on the Syrian military, though unpopular among those peoples whose soldiers would get in harms way, would receive at least widespread acquiescence from world leaders willing to let others take care of Assad's murderous regime; so why not force a veto and rally world opinion against those who would defend the use of chemical weapons? Though this particular case may not be enough, it would lend itself to the growing consensus on the need to reform the Security Council for the 21st Century. The contemporary geopolitical stage is vastly evolved from that of 1945; why not drop the unilateral veto and make Council membership more representative of today's Great Powers?


Which brings us to the elephant in the room: the United States and its allies on the UNSC do not want reform. The perceived risks of introducing new actors and restricting veto powers outweigh the benefit of making the body more responsive to international opinion. Who has been the biggest user of the unilateral veto powers since the USSR stopped trolling the Council in the 1960s? The United States.

No matter how much it hurts the Council's legitimacy to have its most powerful member exercising its veto in its own interest, the capability is far too politically advantageous for the president of the United States to accept relinquishing. The domestic furor generated by accepting limitations on that capability would similarly be politically devastating, correct though the decision may be, particularly in utterly nutty state of today's political discourse. If today's Republicans refuse to sign on to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea for rabid fear of the death knell to American sovereignty--despite desperate urging by every single past US Secretary of State--they are not about to allow a real, if justifiable, reduction of American sovereignty.

Vetoes in the UNSC by country

Worst of all? The US vetoes over the last several decades have almost universally been in support of Israel's illegal occupation of Palestinian territory and war crimes. Though certainly not the sudden atrocity of using chemical weapons against civilians (woops), the ongoing occupation and expanding seizure of Palestinian lands with intent to annex is in blatant violation of international law and human decency--even America's European allies have condemned its uncritical support for the illegalities still perpetrated by the Israeli government.

So long as any administration in power in the United States perceives so much political risk at allowing reform to move ahead, the process will receive little more than lip-service that frustrates our non-member allies and poisons the institution's legitimacy. Intervention in Syria may go to a vote, but the United States will stifle any talk of reform.

3 Reasons For (and Against) Additional US Involvement in Syria

Before we get started, it's important to emphasize that this post is on the merits of additional US involvement in Syria. Which is to say that, for as long as the proponents of intervention have been voicing their arguments, the United States has undertaken a policy of intervention--just not always the kind that will make the nightly news or present a sexy talking point. The Obama administration's policy has long been to provide real support to international efforts for refugees of the conflict. Similarly, opposition groups have received some amount of support, though never sufficiently to their liking. The United States and its allies around the world have cracked down on the Assad regime in a big way, stopping short only where doing so would violate international law or unduly endanger its own forces.

Here, we look at three reasons for and three against expanding the extant involvement in the Syrian civil war--whether it takes the form of anything from a "no fly zone" to an outright overthrow. Though there are a few good arguments for more action, I stand rather solidly as an opponent.

Reasons For

I. The Humanitarian Crisis

A UN refugee camp on Syria's borders

No one can dispute the dire humanitarian situation faced by the average Syrian. Hundreds of thousands have been forced from their homes in the competing wakes of the clashing armed actors. Once idyllic boulevards have been cluttered with dust, debris, and shattered dreams. Those in the camps deserve a chance to make a new life for themselves, but have no opportunity to do so until the fighting stops or another state welcomes them into their own borders on a more permanent basis.

This reason can be taken both as a moral one and one more pragmatic--in the sense that thousands of refugees in neighboring countries are an economic dead-weight and political powder keg. Syria's neighbors share some of its diverse ethnic and sectarian character, so fear the boost to tensions of that nature.

II. The Regional Balance of Power

A reprehensible depiction of Iranian regional influence

With Saddam Hussein long forgotten, the government of Iran has regained its prominence as primary "villain" in the Middle East--or so many proponents of intervention have argued in the past decade. Syria's close ties to the Iran are indisputable and some would characterize those ties as those between puppet and puppeteer. Indeed, Iranian support to the Lebanese political party/guerrilla group Hezbollah and Palestinian organization of the same genre, Hamas, is widely acknowledged, though the particulars disputed.

Proponents of an intervention in Syria are often those who have long been proponents of an intervention in Iran as a response to that country's contentious nuclear energy program and its anti-American/Israeli rhetoric. Proponents assert that toppling the Assad regime would be a major blow to Iranian influence in the region and set the stage for finally dealing with the Iran problem--whether through more stringent isolation of the government or outright military action.

III. American Credibility

McCain (ardent proponent of ambiguous "intervention")  vs the line-drawer

On August 20, 2012, President Obama laid out a "red line" on the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. Of course, that red line was nowhere near as clearly stated as proponents of intervention have since made it out to be, as documented by ABC News. Still, whether the line was one of "chemical weapons use prompts immediate use" or not, many around the world certainly heard it that way. Some argue that the US should act now, even berating Mr. Obama for not announcing his intentions immediately (despite the fact that American and allied forces are now moving into position for potential action).

There are two kinds of credibility supposedly at stake here: 1) America's 'ultimatum' on the Syrian regime (and that of Iran, by proxy); and 2) the international consensus against the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Further Reading:

• Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations: "America Must Respond to the Atrocities in Syria" by conducting cruise missile strikes against selected targets and increasing material aid to fighters.
• Jonathan Mercer on how game theory logically invalidates the concern for reputation.

Reasons Against

I. The Facts on the Ground

Not the type we want ruling Syria

So many words have been wasted promoting the arming of opposition forces in Syria, completely dismissing the fact that those rebel groups favorable to the US are far from dominant in the diverse array of guerrilla organizations. While the Free Syrian Army gets talked up by proponents, a large number of fighters operate under extreme Islamist groups and even an al Qaeda franchise. The groups are unlikely to mount an effort against the interests of the US or its allies in the region so long as Bashar al Assad so preoccupies them, but giving them anti-air and anti-tank weaponry poses a serious threat to regional stability in the long run. We also must ask ourselves, "Who will take the place of Assad when he's gone?"

Further reading:

• Edward Luttwak's controversial and frank piece in the NYTimes: "In Syria, America Loses if Either Side Wins".

II. A War of Choice

Do we really want to tack Syria on top of this?

This reason needs few words, but the collective forgetfulness of proponents necessitates it. America only recently pulled its forces out of Iraq and is still looking to do so now. These wars have been profoundly expensive and, ultimately, unnecessary (Iraq from the beginning, Afghanistan from the Surge). Must we burn another heap of money and lives intervening in a conflict to which we can give no positive outcome?

III. Americans Don't Want War

Americans polled on intervention in Syria and chemical weapons use

A president must not always stick to public opinion. Franklin Roosevelt's slow push to get the United States prepared for conflict in the face of strong isolationist sentiment from the public is one great example. Nonetheless, waging an unpopular war is a good way to turn the country against one's party and maybe, just maybe, the masses may have gotten the thing right.

The poll above shows two things, one of which would seem to contradict this point. I say not. On top, in red, polls indicate that the American people have consistently opposed American intervention in Syria over the last year or so. I'd actually count the "not sure"s as against, given that it's something so drastic as going to war, but they didn't for some reason.

On bottom, the percentage that would support intervention in the event of Assad's use of chemical weapons. Here, we see a drastic swing in those who favor military intervention, but I suspect that the average respondent gave little more thought than "chemical weapons are bad" and thus agreed to the vague concept of "intervention". It will be interesting to see in the next few weeks, as things start heating up, what number of Americans will support the country sliding into another unnecessary war.



As usual, my analysis rests on news stories, blogs, and analysis from others, so the degree of separation from what's actually taking place on the ground could be significant at points. With that in mind, make sure you take some time to follow the events in the news.

Further reading/listening:
 Debate: The US Has No Dog in the Fight In Syria (Intelligence Squared US)

Three Justifications for US Military Aid to Egypt (and Why They're All Wrong)

An Egyptian Humvee passes through a blockade in Cairo

Following the repressive measures taken by the Egyptian military toward the Muslim Brotherhood, I argued that it was time for President Obama to at least put a hold on military aid to that country. But why does Egypt receive that kind of support in the first place? Below is a quick overview of the primary justifications for the program.

First, some numbers. Since 1978, Egypt has received a regular sum of $1.3 billion in military aid annually. This puts it as the second-largest recipient of U.S. aid after Israel. The Congressional Research Service estimates that total aid to Egypt--military and other--totals $71 billion since 1948.

There are three primary aims for the aid provided: stability, influence, and domestic support.

1) Stability -- The aid is explicitly targeted at maintaining the peace accords between Egypt and Israel concluded under President Jimmy Carter at Camp David. Successive administrations have concluded that continuation of the aid has been useful in keeping the generals quiescent and Israel free from attacks from state actors.

2) Influence -- The aid supplied, in addition to deep engagement between the two militaries in the form of war games and officer exchanges, is thought to not only keep the military from pursuing belligerent policy, but to instill in it a degree of American values and professionalism.

3) Domestic Support -- The aid is structured in such a way that the vast majority of expenditures wind up back in the U.S. The reason you’ll see M1 Abrams tanks sitting in the streets of Cairo these days is because the aid makes up almost 80% of Egypt’s weapons procurement, and they are obligated to turn to American suppliers. Keynesian though such stimulus may be, Republican and Democratic presidents alike have embraced the spending as promoting American manufacturing.

Do these justifications pan out? The events of the past months suggest otherwise.

The strongest of the three, the assertion that the aid brings Egyptian power-brokers into line with American interests and values, has been utterly trashed in the bloody wake of the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood. While Army forces did not appear to lead the charge, it was entirely the will of the generals that Egyptian security forces commit the slaughter. The counter-revolution has begun and woe to those who stand against it. But is this reason enough to end the aid? What about Israel’s security?

Honestly, I've always seen the first justification as ridiculous on its face. In order to protect an ally from aggression, we bribe the potential aggressor with high-end military hardware? What a sensible policy that couldn't possibly create the very problem it ostensibly aims to prevent. Fortunately for Israel, the truth is that an Egypt dominated by the military is unlikely to pursue belligerence in any case. Like most armies in military states, the Egyptian armed forces have their fingers in many pies. Essentially an elaborate patronage network with guns, it owns a vast array of manufactures that go beyond the basic needs of a military. The “security” it provides from states that would never conceivably attack it and guerrillas in the Sinai who oddly persist despite the army’s overwhelming superiority. The generals have zero reason to promote a conflict that would devastate their assets.

As for the stimulus to the American economy the aid provides, it would be more efficiently spent elsewhere and in a way far more in line with stated American values.

It’s time to wash our hands of the mess.

Learning the Constitution: The Value of and Danger in Abstractions

A gaggle of great men writing a document that would bind a country together--not to mention maintain slavery, set women aside as lesser beings, and mire the legislative process in procedural Hell.

My previous post began with an oddly naive question from a friend about the power of a constitution. “Why,” he asked, “didn't the Egyptians have the sense to write a stronger constitution that would prevent extraordinary seizures of power by the president?” The question is, of course, nonsensical, as I explained in my post. A constitution is no divine decree issued from on high, but simply a body of imperfect laws to which governmental actors nominally bind themselves in pursuit of legitimacy.

But what piqued my interest today was the fact that my friend had such an un-nuanced view of the matter at all. Many more Americans, too, carry with them such uncritical, black-and-white abstractions of the way government functions--to say nothing of the rest of the world. Where does such thinking come from?

Serendipitously, my current reading offers some insight on the subject. Which some might consider odd as that reading is Clausewitz’s On War. Already showing itself to be a true, if somewhat dated classic, On War delves far deeper into the human condition than its name might suggest. The author takes considerable interest in the pedagogy of the subject and ultimately determines that true learning comes not from a simple presentations of rules and precepts from which never to deviate, but in empowering the student to build his own understanding by providing a foundation of knowledge.

Clausewitz was hardly alone in this idea and, were I more versed in Enlightenment-era philosophy, I could probably cite a few dozen other thinkers reaching much the same conclusion. The concept of teaching critical thinking has been present and applied at least since I entered school. Even provided a sufficiently competent teacher, the problem lies in the student’s mental engagement in the subject.

Let’s jump back to my friend for a moment. Raised in the same school system as I, he received essentially the same educational opportunities and foundations of knowledge. In Freshman year of high school, he learned, like me, the fundamentals of the United States government: three branches; checks and balances; constitution, yada yada yada.

That’s all well and good. What we learned were abstractions of significantly more complex topics, but such is necessary for inattentive 14-year olds. A child learns cars guzzle gas to go fast; a teenager learns that gas is burned in the engine to create small explosions to power pistons that turn the wheels; the aspiring automotive engineer learns far more.

Abstractions exist to be more fully fleshed-out as the intellect develops. Or would be, if the particularly inattentive or incapable had not forgotten what little they remembered after a barely-passing grade. This is not meant to slight anyone’s intelligence: I myself have shown all too meager talent for mathematics or the arts. Different people are better suited to different pursuits.

The problem occurs when the ill-informed fail to recognize their admissible ignorance toward a particular subject or, worse, hold adamantly to a half-baked idea as indisputable fact. Far simpler to teach a person something of which they know nothing than to correct a long-entrenched misconception. While this may be frustrating for a tutor in mathematics, it is outright dangerous when it comes to politics.

Take the idea of a “constitution”. A constitution (or equivalent) is an essential component to any liberal democracy for a variety of reasons that I won’t get into here. Young American students, especially, hear much emphasis on the power of their country’s constitution. But how many fail to learn where that power comes from and what limits it has? They learn of it not as a malleable document but as a timeless symbol, and so succumb to all kinds of magical thinking dangerous to the very democracy their constitution pins together.

What Power in a Constitution? - A Post-Mortem of a Democratic Egypt

Anti-Morsi protest sign

Speaking of the ongoing counter revolution in Egypt yesterday, a friend exclaimed his disbelief that the constitution established in the wake of Mubarak’s overthrow hadn’t contained anything to obstruct the turn toward authoritarianism exhibited by ex-President Morsi shortly after his election. I looked at him levelly for a few moments, then did my best to explain.

A constitution is little more than a diverse set of basic laws given a protection against standard legislative repeal. Like any law, its power depends entirely upon the institutions supporting it and the force those institutions wield. The Egyptian constitution, like most, had a semblance of checks and balances affecting governmental actors. The three branches--the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive--theoretically posed some obstacle to the self-interested advancement of the others. But when Morsi’s party won a majority in the parliament, the newly-elected representatives displayed no qualms in subordinating themselves to the executive as laws and amendments were passed that increasingly turned the public against those in power. The Supreme Court did make an effort to step in, but, in the United States as well as Egypt, what incentive do the other branches have in acknowledging their complaints? What force can the Supreme Court bring to bear on recalcitrant opponents of its rulings?

In Egypt last Fall, the Supreme Court did get its way as Morsi relented in his power grab, but its “constitutional” powers were shown to be limited. So, why did Morsi step on the brakes? Though its reach was limited, the Court lent a legitimacy to protests from other actors; the three most important being 1) The Egyptian military; 2) the Egyptian people; and, 3) the United States.

Egypt being a democracy, the intervention of the military could be taken as a bad omen, one this Summer’s events have fulfilled. In voicing their opinions against the president’s admittedly dangerous policy proposals, the army reminded the world that its nominal subordination to the civilian government, written into the constitution alongside the checks and balances, would be cast to the wind as the generals willed it. Their voices were heard because they were backed by force of arms and a complicit judiciary.

Morsi’s downfall came when the generals perceived the benefits of his unconstitutional overthrow as outweighing the risks. By this summer, the risks were small indeed. A majority of Egyptians polled as dissatisfied with the Morsi government and many had taken to the streets in a repetition of the process that put an end to Mubarak’s decades-long reign. Just as importantly, the state security forces and bureaucracies had lined up behind the army. Days if not weeks before Morsi was dragged out of office, his rule had become ephemeral.

The United States and much of the Western world avoid such democratic devolution primarily by dint of inertia. The traditions of checks and balances have deeper roots, as does the subordination of executive agencies to the executive. This is not to say that there aren’t substantial power-plays in the halls of Washington, but it’s not often that they unseat governments. An attentive citizenry, too, keeps each actor on the straight and narrow. In theory at least.

Could we see events like those in Egypt unfold in the United States? Though we have seen everything from a worrisome broadening of executive power, to an increasingly sclerotic and dysfunctional legislature, to an “attentive” public all-too misinformed by deliberate deceptions from one side of the ideological spectrum, the United States won’t be Egypt any time soon. The primary catalyst for public support of the overthrow of both Mubarak and Morsi was the dire economic situation facing the country. For many average Egyptians, the risk to their livelihoods in sitting idly by outweighed their fears concerning what chaos a revolution would bring. It remains to be seen whether the average Egyptian has lost their revolutionary fervor and would now prefer stability, undemocratic though it might be.

If the world slips back into economic depression, the West can expect renewed radicalism and truly chaotic politics. Otherwise, the status quo may win out and the governments of the United States and its European compatriots may simply continue muddling through.

That the “muddling through” is still of a decidedly downward trend is a topic best saved for another time.

Provocation to Violence: the Crackdown in Egypt

On July 3, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi was ousted by the military in the wake of massive protests against Mr. Morsi and the performance of his government. In the month since, pro-Morsi Muslim Brotherhood supporters have engaged in peaceful, if disruptive protest unmolested by the security forces. Until yesterday:

WARNING: GRAPHIC

I half-heartedly supported Morsi's removal, but this move is worthy of only condemnation. In his little more than a year in office, Morsi focused on implementing restrictive social policy over addressing the woes of the Egyptian economy. When a massive coalition of secularists, liberals, and even the extreme Islamist Salafis took to the streets in numbers unseen since Mubarak's removal, it came as little surprise. The police took no action against them and, I suspect, had no small amount of complicity. The army's declaration of the end of Morsi's presidency undermined democracy, but they had little alternative.

But yesterday was entirely unnecessary. Feathers could have been smoothed over and the Brotherhood brought back into the political process, but they instead decided to engage in a thoroughly undemocratic suppression of the protests. The use of such disproportionate, lethal force can only be taken as deliberate provocation and can be taken to mean that the military has no intention of setting the country back on a democratic track. The extreme violence used will--and has already been reported to--inspire a response in kind.

The generals can't get what they want through the ballot box, so they've generated a environment of crisis with which they'll push through whatever measures they like.

The real leverage the United States wields over the Egyptian military is questionable, but it's time for the United States to pull the substantial aid it provides. It may not stop the killings, but it would divest this administration of the link to a thoroughly anti-democratic regime.