What Power in a Constitution? - A Post-Mortem of a Democratic Egypt

Anti-Morsi protest sign

Speaking of the ongoing counter revolution in Egypt yesterday, a friend exclaimed his disbelief that the constitution established in the wake of Mubarak’s overthrow hadn’t contained anything to obstruct the turn toward authoritarianism exhibited by ex-President Morsi shortly after his election. I looked at him levelly for a few moments, then did my best to explain.

A constitution is little more than a diverse set of basic laws given a protection against standard legislative repeal. Like any law, its power depends entirely upon the institutions supporting it and the force those institutions wield. The Egyptian constitution, like most, had a semblance of checks and balances affecting governmental actors. The three branches--the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive--theoretically posed some obstacle to the self-interested advancement of the others. But when Morsi’s party won a majority in the parliament, the newly-elected representatives displayed no qualms in subordinating themselves to the executive as laws and amendments were passed that increasingly turned the public against those in power. The Supreme Court did make an effort to step in, but, in the United States as well as Egypt, what incentive do the other branches have in acknowledging their complaints? What force can the Supreme Court bring to bear on recalcitrant opponents of its rulings?

In Egypt last Fall, the Supreme Court did get its way as Morsi relented in his power grab, but its “constitutional” powers were shown to be limited. So, why did Morsi step on the brakes? Though its reach was limited, the Court lent a legitimacy to protests from other actors; the three most important being 1) The Egyptian military; 2) the Egyptian people; and, 3) the United States.

Egypt being a democracy, the intervention of the military could be taken as a bad omen, one this Summer’s events have fulfilled. In voicing their opinions against the president’s admittedly dangerous policy proposals, the army reminded the world that its nominal subordination to the civilian government, written into the constitution alongside the checks and balances, would be cast to the wind as the generals willed it. Their voices were heard because they were backed by force of arms and a complicit judiciary.

Morsi’s downfall came when the generals perceived the benefits of his unconstitutional overthrow as outweighing the risks. By this summer, the risks were small indeed. A majority of Egyptians polled as dissatisfied with the Morsi government and many had taken to the streets in a repetition of the process that put an end to Mubarak’s decades-long reign. Just as importantly, the state security forces and bureaucracies had lined up behind the army. Days if not weeks before Morsi was dragged out of office, his rule had become ephemeral.

The United States and much of the Western world avoid such democratic devolution primarily by dint of inertia. The traditions of checks and balances have deeper roots, as does the subordination of executive agencies to the executive. This is not to say that there aren’t substantial power-plays in the halls of Washington, but it’s not often that they unseat governments. An attentive citizenry, too, keeps each actor on the straight and narrow. In theory at least.

Could we see events like those in Egypt unfold in the United States? Though we have seen everything from a worrisome broadening of executive power, to an increasingly sclerotic and dysfunctional legislature, to an “attentive” public all-too misinformed by deliberate deceptions from one side of the ideological spectrum, the United States won’t be Egypt any time soon. The primary catalyst for public support of the overthrow of both Mubarak and Morsi was the dire economic situation facing the country. For many average Egyptians, the risk to their livelihoods in sitting idly by outweighed their fears concerning what chaos a revolution would bring. It remains to be seen whether the average Egyptian has lost their revolutionary fervor and would now prefer stability, undemocratic though it might be.

If the world slips back into economic depression, the West can expect renewed radicalism and truly chaotic politics. Otherwise, the status quo may win out and the governments of the United States and its European compatriots may simply continue muddling through.

That the “muddling through” is still of a decidedly downward trend is a topic best saved for another time.