On July 3rd, 2013--mere hours ago as of this writing--Mohammed Morsi's brief time as president of Egypt was put to an end. The precedent set is of mixed quality: ousted in a unilateral declaration from the national army, but on the very explicit behest of the Egyptian people, it is hard to say what the future holds for Egyptian democracy. The extra-constitutional removal of a sitting president is hardly a recipe for governmental stability in the future, but it is difficult to imagine what alternative path might have been taken with hundreds of thousands of citizens in the streets and Morsi obstinately refusing any concession. In his year in power, Morsi presided over an economy in a downward spiral yet focused instead on cementing his own rule (inadequately) and forcing through social policy of a decidedly Islamist tinge.
Anyone expecting a new start and quick turn of fortune for Egypt is unfortunately asking too much. For a country in which tourism plays such a vital role in the economy, the upheavals and general decay in social order of the last few years have strangled the industry. The interim government and any hypothetical successor--legitimately elected or not--may prove no more successful than their predecessor at arresting the decline. Egypt may well be in the grip of a vicious cycle: a poor economy creates frustrated citizens; frustrated citizens create social disorder, social disorder worsens the economy, and so on.
What does this all mean for the United States? While we should hope for the best, we must prepare for the worst. What follows are three potentially deleterious consequences of these recent events for American interests.
1) The Egyptian Army Loses Legitimacy
The Egyptian military is theoretically the actor most attuned to desires in Washington, thanks to decades of officer exchange programs and, of course, billions of dollars in direct military aid. Almost a state within a state, the military is relatively well-off and uneager to jeopardize their position. At the moment they retain the population's long-standing respect and are boosted by the latest intervention, but the longer they stay in the public sphere, the more likely it is for popular attitudes to turn against them.
This could be seen during the lead-up to last-year's elections, when many of the same standing in the streets these last few days then stood against military leaders out of fear of encroaching military dictatorship. If perceived to be too heavy-handed and power-hungry, the military could soon find renewed protests targeting them. On the other hand, inaction, too, could diminsh their reputation if the country's internal security further deteriorates. A classic "Damned if you do; damned if you don't" situation, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces must walk a very fine line in the year ahead. The Obama administration should probably offer advice on the matter, though ought take care not to be condescending.
2) The Muslim Brotherhood Radicalizes
For decades, the Muslim Brotherhood had been the opposition party in Egypt, almost institutionally so. Those seeking alternative to Mubarak's unflinching authoritarianism turned to it, whether Islam factored into their priorities or not. But it was not always so. Before an uneasy ceasefire settled between the Brothers and the regime, the organization was not too far divided from those pursuing a violent end to the governments of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak.
If pushed by the military and the internal security forces, a rhetoric of resistance could well re-emerge. While much of cosmopolitan Egypt may turn their backs, the more traditional hinterland may show a greater degree of sympathy. Needless to say, more religiously-themed conflict is the last thing the region needs. If the Muslim Brotherhood or a more extreme alternative turn to force of arms, an already bloody region will get bloodier. The United States must discourage the leaders of this coup from instigating revanchism.
3) The International Community Intervenes in the Suez
The Suez Canal is one of the most frequented shipping routes in the world and is particularly vital to the European market. Whether from radicalized Islamists, tribes of the Sinai, or just disgruntled hooligans, threats or outright damages could trigger an international response aimed at safeguarding traffic. The Egyptian people may respond none to well to foreign intervention on their sovereign territory and the action would add yet further tension to the region. The United States along with its allies must reaffirm to the Egyptian military just how vital the Canal is.
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